UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/1996/75
31 January 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM III)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1008 (1995) of 7 August 1995, in which the Council, inter alia, decided to extend the mandate of the Mission until 8 February 1996. It reviews major events from 8 August 1995 and covers developments since my report of 7 December 1995 (S/1995/1012).

II. POLITICAL ASPECTS

2. Since my last report, progress in the peace process in Angola has been very slow. It had been expected that the meetings between President José Eduardo dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi, President of the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), which took place in Franceville, Gabon on 10 August and in Brussels on 25 September 1995, together with the resumption of military talks between the two parties and the commencement of the quartering of UNITA troops on 20 November 1995, would foster a climate of mutual trust and confidence between the Government and UNITA. However, a serious setback occurred towards the end of 1995, when the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) took control of several locations in the oil-producing region of Soyo, in the province of Zaire. Citing this offensive, UNITA suspended the quartering of its troops, withdrew its assistance to UNAVEM III in the construction of quartering areas and, in some areas under its control, imposed restrictions on the movement of UNAVEM III and other international personnel, including those of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

3. Following persistent efforts by my Special Representative, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, a government delegation met with UNITA leaders in their Bailundo headquarters on 21 December 1995 to review the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol (see S/1994/441, annex). The two parties undertook once again to start fulfilling their respective obligations as soon as possible. These include the definitive cessation of all military activities, the conclusion of military talks, the release of prisoners, an end to hostile propaganda, the resumption of the quartering of UNITA troops, the quartering of the rapid reaction police and the withdrawal of FAA to the nearest barracks.

4. However, UNITA failed to take the steps necessary to move the peace process forward, citing complaints of military threats to its forces in several parts of the country. The members of the Joint Commission, which is the main body responsible for the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, deplored the Government's violations of the cease-fire and UNITA's refusal to resume implementation of the peace process, in particular the quartering of its troops.

5. In early January 1996, I telephoned Mr. Savimbi, expressed my strong concern at the sluggish pace of progress and urged him to help put the peace process back on track. My Special Representative and the representatives of the three observer States (Portugal, Russian Federation and United States of America) also made several individual and collective démarches to the parties, including to the two leaders. The visit to Angola by President Mário Soares of Portugal, who graciously agreed to convey a message from me to the two parties, was an important contribution to these collective efforts. They resulted, on 12 January 1996, in the acceptance by the two parties of a new timetable for the implementation of the understandings reached by their representatives on 21 December 1995.

6. The letters addressed to both Angolan leaders by the President of the Security Council on 15 January (S/1996/31 and 32), which were delivered to them by the Permanent Representative of the United States during her recent visit to the country, further underscored the growing impatience of the international community and the need to make progress towards the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol.

7. The quartering of UNITA troops has yet to resume in earnest. The Government has, however, taken some significant steps, including withdrawing its forces from Pedra do Alemao, a forward position near the quartering area of Vila Nova, and starting the quartering of its rapid reaction police. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has confirmed that the Government has released 350 registered prisoners. All prisoners identified by the Government have thus been freed. UNITA, which has so far freed only 44 prisoners, has yet to make a similar effort. The Government also announced that it was terminating its contract with the firm "Executive Outcomes" which has provided it with military and security support. A large group of the personnel concerned departed the country from the military base in Cabo Ledo, Bengo province, on 11 January, but UNITA claims that others remain in the country. I urge the two parties, once again, to find the earliest possible solution to this sensitive issue.

8. Pursuant to article 12 of the status-of-forces agreement of 3 May 1995 between the United Nations and the Government, and in accordance with the decisions of the Security Council, UNAVEM III has made all arrangements necessary for the establishment in Angola of an independent United Nations radio station. The Government has still not granted UNAVEM III the requisite facilities in this regard, although it has provided additional time on the Angolan national radio and television for UNAVEM information programmes.

III. MILITARY ASPECTS

A. Observance of the cease-fire

9. Although the military situation has been relatively quiet in recent weeks, the cease-fire had been seriously undermined in early December 1995 by an offensive by government troops around Soyo. As a result, tensions between FAA and UNITA troops again rose in various parts of the country, attesting to the fragility of the peace process. However, under intense political pressure, FAA withdrew from the positions concerned late in December. As a confidence-building measure, a platoon of United Nations troops was deployed to a strategically important location in this area, despite the fact that UNAVEM III is neither equipped nor mandated to serve as an interpositioned disengagement force.

10. Between 1 December 1995 and 25 January 1996, a total of 154 cease-fire violations (58 of them attributed to FAA, 91 to UNITA and 5 of unknown origin) were reported. Frequent breaches of the cease-fire occurred as a result of small-scale troop advances, attacks on and looting of villages, forced conscriptions (particularly by UNITA) and ambushes. Many of them consisted of acts of banditry. On 18 December, a UNITA-chartered aircraft belonging to a company based in Zaire crashed in the southern part of Angola; the Government strongly protested this unauthorized flight and asked the United Nations to participate in a comprehensive investigation (see S/1995/1066).

11. The period immediately following the government offensive was marked by an escalation of hostility by UNITA towards UNAVEM III, which was painfully reminiscent of similar behaviour in the past. Until recently, UNITA had withdrawn all its liaison officers from United Nations team sites and its workforce from the quartering areas. It had also placed restrictions on UNAVEM III activities in many areas under its control. On two occasions, UNITA prevented United Nations teams from leaving their camp; it also threatened to shoot down UNAVEM III aircraft that flew without its prior clearance and resorted to a public campaign against UNAVEM III.

12. During the second half of January 1996, however, the Government and UNITA agreed to the establishment of a "conflict prevention group" which includes high-ranking military representatives of the two parties. The group operates out of UNAVEM III headquarters in Luanda and is expected to maintain direct communications with the respective military authorities and field commanders to prevent or rapidly de-escalate cease-fire violations.

B. Completion of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces

13. After an absence of almost two months, the UNITA military delegation returned to Luanda on 11 January 1996 to resume bilateral negotiations on the completion of the formation of the joint armed forces. By mid-January, military delegations of the two parties reached an important agreement under which UNITA will provide 26,000 soldiers to the national army, 200 personnel to the air force and 100 to the navy, in addition to the more than 2,500 already integrated into FAA in 1992. However, crucial details regarding the structure of the joint

armed forces, the allocation of posts and, in particular, the creation of a fourth branch of FAA to perform tasks associated with national reconstruction still need to be finalized. Negotiations on these issues are proceeding with difficulty but UNAVEM III is assisting the parties to find a workable, fair and durable solution.

C. Quartering process

14. It is disturbing that, more than one year after the signing of the Lusaka Protocol, the quartering of UNITA troops - one of the central elements of the peace process - has not made any significant progress. Shortly after the cantonment of UNITA troops began in November 1995, it ground to a halt and was later declared officially suspended. Since then, the search for excuses to delay this process has continued. Nevertheless, UNAVEM III, including its infantry units (which are not intended to perform such tasks), have proceeded with the construction of quartering areas. Four such areas, with a capacity to accommodate up to 20,000 soldiers, have been ready for some time; work at 10 others is either under way or close to completion.

15. On 19 January 1996, Mr. Savimbi pledged that 16,500 troops out of the declared 62,500 UNITA military personnel would report to the quartering areas by 8 February. However, as of 25 January, only the Vila Nova camp was operational, with a total of 693 UNITA troops registered there and approximately 600 of their dependants settled nearby. There are reports, however, that some of the assembled soldiers are under age, that they came without uniform and that they were carrying old weapons. After protracted discussions, UNITA has accepted that it has primary responsibility for erecting temporary shelters for family members of its troops, using plastic sheeting supplied by the donor community. As soldiers' dependants relocate to these temporary sites, they will be registered and receive appropriate humanitarian assistance.

16. In the meantime, the required United Nations and NGO personnel have for some time been deployed to those quartering areas which have been completed. The long delays in beginning the assembly process have placed additional strains on the limited resources available to United Nations agencies and NGOs, not to mention the deterioration of costly United Nations equipment already supplied to these camps.

D. Demining and road rehabilitation

17. Demining, mine verification and reconstruction of access roads and bridges remain daunting tasks, which affect many aspects of the peace process in Angola. UNAVEM III engineer and bridging units, together with four international NGOs, have continued relevant operations throughout the country. After protracted delays, the South African mine verification company, MECHEM, was allowed by the Government to begin working on northern and southern routes. However, its operations were recently suspended following an ambush of one of its convoys. These continuing delays in the start of MECHEM activities will have budgetary implications. Unfortunately, the efforts of the Angolan parties in this area continued to be minimal; the only significant joint FAA/UNITA demining

operation, in Cuito Cuanavale, was halted as a result of the government offensive in November 1995.

18. In the meantime, the Secretariat has reviewed the mine action plan for Angola and approved an accelerated implementation plan as of 1 January 1996; the plan is aimed at developing a sustainable national mine-clearance capacity and provides for funds that were not used in 1995 to be carried over to the next budget. The Central Mine Action Training School organized by UNAVEM III was opened in Luanda in December 1995; it will operate under the command of the UNAVEM III Force Commander until 1997, when it will be taken over by the Angolan National Institute for the Removal of Explosive Devices, which has been set up with the assistance of the United Nations and has already trained 183 specialists. The training school has commenced its first course for 25 Angolan instructors, which will be followed by a demining course in Kuito for 66 students. Mine awareness training, in which the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and several NGOs are involved, continued in several parts of the country.

E. UNAVEM III strength and deployment

19. As of 25 January 1996, the strength of UNAVEM III military personnel was 6,384, including 342 military observers. The number of team sites where United Nations military and police observers are deployed remains at 54, to be increased by 5 when logistically feasible. Notwithstanding the formidable difficulties presented by mined roads and logistical constraints, United Nations troops are present in all quartering areas and storage sites for weapons collected from UNITA.

20. A Zambian unit of 300 personnel was deployed to the south-eastern region in December 1995. It was followed by the deployment of a 200-strong Namibian mine verification company to the central region in January 1996. The induction of the Ukrainian bridging company, which is essential for the opening of the strategically important Malange-Saurimo road, is expected in early March 1996. After the most recent withdrawal by a Member State of its offer to provide a 300-strong infantry unit, the Secretariat has initiated urgent consultations to find a replacement. In the meantime, several contingents that deployed to Angola in the middle of 1995 have begun scheduled rotations.

IV. POLICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS ASPECTS

21. The UNAVEM III civilian police observer component (CIVPOL), composed of 225 officers deployed to 33 team sites, has stepped up its monitoring of the neutrality of the Angolan National Police, security arrangements for UNITA leaders in Luanda, quartering of the rapid reaction police, free circulation of people and goods and the general law and order situation in the country. In addition, CIVPOL observers continued to assist the Human Rights Unit of UNAVEM III. Between 1 January 1995 and 25 January 1996, a total of 330 cases related to human rights, the neutrality of the Angolan National Police and accidents involving United Nations personnel and property were investigated.

22. As a result of recent understandings, the Government started the quartering of the rapid reaction police on 10 January 1996, when 1,056 personnel were quartered in Luanda, followed by 237 in Uige on 17 January and 469 in Huambo on 24 January. Lists of personnel quartered in these cities and their armaments were handed over to UNAVEM III, but consultations between the United Nations and the Government concerning the overall strength of this police branch and its equipment are still continuing. Massive quartering of the rapid reaction police presents a particular challenge to the Government and I appeal to the donor community to provide additional resources to support this vital undertaking.

23. There is an urgent need for the two parties to agree on a comprehensive security plan for UNITA leaders. UNITA recently submitted to the United Nations a list of 20 of its officials who require special protection in the national capital; as a special measure, security arrangements were also extended to the head and deputy head of the UNITA delegation to the Joint Commission. In the meantime, the Angolan National Police indicated its readiness to train 212 UNITA personnel to serve officially as bodyguards for the UNITA leadership. It is imperative, therefore, for UNITA to provide the required number of personnel without further delay.

24. The disarmament of the civilian population throughout the country, which is another essential element of the Lusaka Protocol, has also not commenced. UNAVEM III has prepared recommendations on the modalities of this process, but the Government believes that it should begin only after the completion of the quartering of UNITA troops. However, the increasing number of acts of banditry and the deterioration of law and order throughout Angola calls for the expeditious start of the disarmament campaign.

25. The human rights situation in Angola also remains a source of concern. Reports from UNAVEM III CIVPOL teams and United Nations human rights experts, who are now deployed to all six regions, indicate that assassinations, abductions, looting, extortion, restrictions on the freedom of movement and other criminal acts continue unabated in many parts of the country. These abuses are perpetrated by both UNITA and government forces, as well as by other unidentified armed elements, who usually target the most vulnerable sectors of the civilian population.

26. A national seminar on human rights, organized by the Angolan Government with the support of UNAVEM III, was held in Luanda on 17 and 18 January 1996. The seminar reviewed the situation in this domain and formulated a strategy for promoting fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. One of its main conclusions was that respect for human rights is both a prerequisite and a guarantee for lasting peace in Angola. It was also widely recognized that the country needs special assistance, including funding, for human rights education and for the strengthening of the judicial system.

V. HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS

27. Since the beginning of December 1995, security for humanitarian assistance activities has deteriorated in many parts of the country, especially those controlled by UNITA. In some provinces several relief flights could not take

place because of restrictions imposed by UNITA; road convoys had to be cancelled in some areas, since security guarantees could not be obtained by UNAVEM III. There were also incidents of confiscation of relief goods, vehicles and radios, as well as harassment of humanitarian personnel and, in a few cases, their temporary detention. As a result, one international NGO suspended its activities in UNITA-held areas. Several NGOs that had previously expressed willingness to expand their humanitarian activities to UNITA areas are increasingly reluctant to do so. Aware of this trend, UNITA issued a public statement on 1 January 1996, promising to facilitate the work of humanitarian organizations and to respect the integrity of their staff and safeguard their property. I hope that this promise will be honoured.

28. Humanitarian assistance activities were none the less carried out wherever possible. These included deliveries of food, seeds and medical supplies, as well as nutritional assessments and the repair of medical equipment. Efforts to promote reconciliation between the Government and UNITA were supported by arranging for their joint participation in humanitarian projects. Special training was particularly aimed at UNITA health personnel assigned to work at several quartering areas in the central part of the country. Joint missions by representatives of UNAVEM III, the United Nations Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UCAH), UNITA and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) visited centres for disabled UNITA soldiers in order to prepare for the future demobilization of this vulnerable group.

29. Thirteen bailey bridges donated by the Government of the United States have arrived in Angola. These bridges will be erected by UNAVEM III military engineers to enhance the operations of the peace-keeping force and the free circulation of people and goods.

30. The difficulties encountered in the peace process during 1995 have led to a slower rhythm than expected in the implementation of the humanitarian assistance programme. With the quartering and demobilization of troops behind schedule, very few refugees and internally displaced people have been able to return and resume productive activities in their areas of origin or choice. As a consequence, there is a need for substantial humanitarian assistance during 1996 for the demobilization process, demining activities and the resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees.

VI. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ASPECTS

31. During the past six months, the Angolan economy deteriorated further, which resulted in a budget deficit of US$ 600 million. The financing of this deficit fuelled inflation, which reached 2,000 per cent for 1995. This situation is partly a result of the complex post-war problems facing the Government; but it also reflects the Government's difficulty in implementing effective stabilization measures and the necessary reforms.

32. In December 1995, a mission of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) visited Angola to assess the evolution of the staff monitoring programme, which was negotiated with the Government in August 1995. The mission concluded that the majority of the provisions in this programme had not been implemented. This

led to suspension of the programme. Apart from the lack of national capacity to implement and monitor many economic and financial policies, IMF was also concerned at the absence of a political consensus in favour of macroeconomic stabilization. As soon as adequate consensus emerges and improved implementation capacity is established, IMF will be ready to resume negotiations at once for a new programme. It is expected that, as an interim measure, the Government and IMF will concentrate on implementing only a few measures and institutional reforms aimed at stabilization. In the meantime, the Director of the World Bank Division for Southern Africa has visited Angola to continue the ongoing discussions on the economic reform programme and the prospect for World Bank assistance for the rehabilitation of Angola.

33. On 30 November 1995, a review meeting was held in Luanda, organized with the collaboration of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), to assess and approve the evaluation report of the national financial systems project, which provides technical assistance in the areas of bank supervision and monetary operations, government budgeting and tax and customs administration. The donors, Sweden and France, as well as IMF, reiterated their readiness to provide support in this domain and to prepare a third phase of this project in May 1996. Furthermore, the Government requested UNDP, in cooperation with its development partners, to review the projects related to institutional capacity for economic management.

34. As a follow-up to the round-table conference held in Brussels on 25 and 26 September 1995, the Government, assisted by UNDP, invited the representatives of the donor community to a briefing on the latest developments in the round-table process, at which it presented its proposed structure for the national coordination and implementation programme. With regard to the launching of the community rehabilitation programme in early 1996, several donors have reaffirmed their intention to send appraisal missions to Angola in the near future. At the same time, it is obvious that, while international private business is interested in investing in Angola, it will require concrete evidence that the peace process has made major progress and that the necessary economic reforms are under way.

VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

35. By its resolution 50/209 of 23 December 1995, the General Assembly authorized me to enter into commitments at a monthly rate not to exceed US$ 28,229,100 gross for the maintenance of UNAVEM III from 9 February to 30 June 1996, subject to the extension of its mandate by the Security Council. Therefore, should the Council decide to extend the mandate of UNAVEM III, as recommended in paragraph 41 below, I shall seek from the General Assembly at its resumed fiftieth session the additional resources required for the period beyond 30 June 1996.

36. As of 22 January 1996, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNAVEM special account for the period since the inception of the Mission to 31 December 1995 amounted to US$ 26.4 million. This amount does not reflect the most recent appropriation of US$ 36.7 million from the General Assembly for the period from

1 January to 8 February 1996. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations as of 22 January 1996 was US$ 1,680.3 million.

VIII. OBSERVATIONS

37. As detailed above, the peace process in Angola has been proceeding at a disappointingly slow pace. Since August 1995, recurring impasses alternated with brief periods of cooperation between the Government and UNITA, and the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol is still woefully behind schedule. The United Nations has spared no effort to create the environment necessary for the implementation of the Protocol. However, a deep-seated mistrust and a lack of political will to take decisive measures has prevented the parties from honouring their commitments.

38. Recently, both the Government and UNITA agreed on a new timetable to move the peace process forward. This is a welcome development; but major steps need to be taken to dispel the international community's growing impatience and scepticism about the peace process. The time has come to match promises with concrete action. The parties will be doing great disservice to the people of Angola, the future of their country and, indeed, their own credibility if they continue to fail to honour their commitments. The latest assurances about the implementation of the new timetable should be strictly adhered to.

39. The promising steps taken by the Government of Angola in the last few weeks are encouraging. I urge UNITA to respond positively, first of all by a large-scale and fully verifiable movement of its troops to quartering areas. Nor is there any excuse for further delays in the release of all prisoners or in the provision to the United Nations of the information required by the Lusaka Protocol.

40. Bold measures need to be taken by the Government and UNITA to make the peace process irreversible. The talks on military matters must be concluded as a matter of urgency, with workable and fair agreements concerning the incorporation of UNITA troops in FAA and the gradual demobilization of its other forces. The assembly of UNITA soldiers has to be accompanied by an accelerated withdrawal of FAA to the nearest barracks and the completion of the quartering of the rapid reaction police. Joint demining and opening of roads, as well as the free circulation of people throughout the country, are imperative to foster national reconciliation. I also urge President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi to meet as soon as possible in order to promote mutual confidence and resolve outstanding issues.

41. The success of the peace process lies in the hands of the Angolan parties. I am convinced that the international community will continue to respond positively to all constructive initiatives taken by them. The failure of past attempts to bring peace to Angola underscores the need for active international involvement and encouragement. It is in this spirit that I recommend that the mandate of UNAVEM III be extended for a further six months, until 8 August 1996. I will continue to submit comprehensive reports to the Security Council every two months and to keep it informed on a regular basis of all relevant

developments, especially if either of the parties again fails to honour its undertakings.

42. Although the humanitarian situation in the country improved somewhat during 1995, large segments of the population still require massive emergency assistance. With the consolidation of peace, increased assistance and continued strong coordination will be needed for the return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons, for the quartering, demobilization and reintegration of soldiers into civilian life, as well as for demining activities. In February, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs will issue a revised version of the current inter-agency appeal, extending the existing humanitarian programme through 1996. I hope that the donor community will respond generously.

43. Finally, I would like to pay tribute to my Special Representative and to the staff of UNAVEM III, as well as to the personnel of the United Nations programmes and agencies and NGOs, for their commendable work under challenging conditions. I also wish to express my appreciation to the three observer States, to their representatives in Angola, and to all other Member States for their unfailing support to the Angolan peace process.

Annex

UNAVEM III - Military and civilian police personnel (as of 25 January 1996)

Country	Military observers	Civilian police officers	Staff officers	Troops	Total
Algeria	8	--	--	--	8
Argentina	--	--	--	--	--
Bangladesh	10	21	21	200	252
Brazil	23 a/	17	38	1 033	1 111
Bulgaria	9	15	--	--	24
Congo	8	--	--	--	8
Egypt	10	15	--	--	25
Fiji	--	10	--	--	10
France	8	--	12	--	20
Guinea-Bissau	20	1	--	--	21
Hungary	10	3	--	--	13
India	19	13	49	1 014	1 095
Italy	--	--	4	--	4
Jordan	20	21	--	--	41
Kenya	10	--	--	--	10
Malaysia	20	6	--	--	26
Mali	10	15	--	--	25
Namibia	--	--	--	199	199
Netherlands	15	8	8	--	31
New Zealand	5	--	8	--	13
Nigeria	20	8	--	--	28
Norway	5	--	--	--	5
Pakistan	5	--	6	--	11
Poland	7	--	--	--	7
Portugal	8	11	20	210	249
Republic of Korea	--	--	--	198	198
Romania	--	--	26	859	885
Russian Federation	8	--	--	159	167
Senegal	10	--	--	--	10
Slovakia	5	--	--	--	5
Sweden	21	9	--	--	30
Ukraine	5	--	--	--	5

Country	Military observers	Civilian police officers	Staff officers	Troops	Total
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	--	--	2	--	2
United Republic of Tanzania	--	3	--	--	3
Uruguay	10	12	38	800	860
Zambia	10	15	12	295	332
Zimbabwe	23	22	35	796	876
Total	342	225	279	5 763	6 609

a/ Including three medical personnel.

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1 February 1996

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LETTER DATED 1 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The members of the Security Council have noted your report of 29 January 1996 pursuant to resolution 1027 (1995) (S/1996/65).

The members of the Security Council concur in principle with your recommendation that the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) become an independent mission which will have basically the same mandate, strength and composition of forces. They will continue their consideration of your report in the light of concrete proposals that you intend to put forward on the financial and administrative aspects of this change.

(Signed) Madeleine Korbel ALBRIGHT
President of the Security Council

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1 February 1996
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LETTER DATED 1 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF KAZAKSTAN, KYRGYZSTAN, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, TAJIKISTAN AND UZBEKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the Joint Declaration on Tajikistan, issued on 19 January 1996 by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan.

I should be grateful if this letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) A. ARYSTANBEKOVA
Permanent Representative of
the Republic of Kazakstan
to the United Nations

(Signed) S. LAVROV
Permanent Representative of
the Russian Federation to
the United Nations

(Signed) R. ALIMOV
Permanent Representative of
the Republic of Tajikistan
to the United Nations

(Signed) F. TESHABAEV
Permanent Representative of
the Republic of Uzbekistan
to the United Nations

(Signed) A. AITMATOV
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Kyrgyz Republic
to the United Nations

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Annex

Joint Declaration on Tajikistan

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan, participating in the work of the Council of Heads of States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), affirmed their strong conviction that a settlement of the conflict in Tajikistan can be achieved only by political means, through dialogue between the parties and on the basis of compromises and mutual concessions. They express their readiness to continue to do all they can to sustain the inter-Tajik negotiating process under United Nations auspices.

The first stage of the fifth round of inter-Tajik talks, held at the end of last year at Ashkhabad, was unfortunately not promising. In this connection the heads of foreign policy departments of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan expect the negotiators to begin the second stage of the round at the earliest opportunity and to use that opportunity for intensive work to identify a real formula of national reconciliation and to create an effective mechanism for the establishment of peace and concord in Tajikistan.

The Ministers emphasized that one essential prerequisite for successful advancement of the negotiating process is strict compliance with the provisions of the Tehran Agreement of 17 September 1994 on a provisional cease-fire and the cessation of other hostilities, commitment to which was reaffirmed by the parties at Ashkhabad.

The Ministers expressed their concern at the continuing tension on the Tajik-Afghan border as a result of further shelling incidents and attacks on frontier posts and positions. In this context they noted the important role played by the Russian frontier forces and the Kazak and Kyrgyz units in ensuring that the border is reliably protected and secured.

The heads of foreign policy departments stressed the highly topical nature of interaction within the framework of the CIS Collective Peace-keeping Forces (CPF), whose presence in Tajikistan remains a vital factor in curbing the conflict and stabilizing the situation in the country. In this light, the decision adopted at Moscow by the Council of CIS Heads of State to extend the length of stay of CPF in Tajikistan for a further period of six months until 30 June 1996 assumes great importance. The Ministers noted that one highly important condition for the further presence of CPF in that country would be effective action by the conflicting parties towards a full settlement of the situation in Tajikistan.

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan hope that the Government of Tajikistan will, during the aforementioned period, take the measures required to achieve peace and stability in Tajik territory.

The heads of foreign policy departments of the five States urge the Tajik opposition to recognize the existing Government of Tajikistan, to abstain from military action and acts of terrorism and to pursue political dialogue with a view to achieving concord and tranquillity in Tajikistan.

Noting the positive role of the United Nations in matters relating to a Tajik settlement, the Ministers welcomed the decision to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan, adopted by the Security Council on 14 December 1995.

The Ministers reaffirmed that their countries would do all in their power, in close cooperation with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and with the States attending the inter-Tajik talks as observers, to facilitate national reconciliation and concord in Tajikistan and to promote a productive prolongation of the inter-Tajik dialogue for this purpose.

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE CREDENTIALS OF THE ALTERNATE REPRESENTATIVES OF ITALY ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

1. Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 30 January 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations, stating that Mr. Alessandro Busacca and Mr. Sebastiano Cardi have been appointed Alternate Representatives of Italy on the Security Council.

2. In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 31 JANUARY 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 1035 (1995) of 21 December 1995.

With reference to operative paragraph 3 of that resolution, I wish to inform you of my decision to appoint Mr. Iqbal Riza (Pakistan) as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I would also like to inform you that, pursuant to operative paragraph 2 of the same resolution, I have appointed Mr. Peter FitzGerald (Ireland) as the Commissioner of the International Police Task Force (IPTF).

I would appreciate your bringing the above to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

96-02320 (E) 010296 020296

UNITED
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Security Council

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S/1996/80
1 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 1 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 31 January 1996 (S/1996/79) concerning the appointment of Mr. Iqbal Riza as your Special Representative and Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the appointment of Mr. Peter FitzGerald as the Commissioner of the International Police Task Force (IPTF) has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They agree with the decisions contained in your letter.

(Signed) Madeleine Korbel ALBRIGHT
President of the Security Council

96-02326 (E) 010296 020296

UNITED
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S/1996/81
2 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONCERNING THE CREDENTIALS OF THE DEPUTY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA ON THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 30 January 1996 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations stating that Mr. Sung Hong Choi has been appointed deputy representative of the Republic of Korea on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, that letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.

96-02377 (E) 020296 050296

UNITED
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S/1996/82
2 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 1 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO RESOLUTION 918 (1994) CONCERNING RWANDA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 918 (1994) concerning Rwanda, containing an account of the Committee's activities since its establishment until 31 December 1995. The present report, which was adopted by the Committee under the no-objection procedure on 26 January 1996, is being submitted in accordance with the note by the President of the Security Council of 29 March 1995 (S/1995/234).

(Signed) Nugroho WISNUMURTI
Chairman
Security Council Committee established
pursuant to resolution 918 (1994)
concerning Rwanda

96-02450 (E) 020296 050296

/...

Annex

Report of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 918 (1994) concerning Rwanda

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By its resolution 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, imposed mandatory sanctions against Rwanda, relating to the sale or supply to Rwanda of arms and related matériel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment and spare parts.

2. By paragraph 14 of the same resolution, the Security Council established a Committee consisting of all members of the Council to undertake the following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations and recommendations:

(a) To seek from all States information regarding the action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the embargo imposed by paragraph 13 of resolution 918 (1994);

(b) To consider any information brought to its attention by States concerning violations of the embargo, and in that context to make recommendations to the Council on ways of increasing the effectiveness of the embargo;

(c) To recommend appropriate measures in response to violations of the embargo imposed by paragraph 13 of resolution 918 (1994) and provide information on a regular basis to the Secretary-General for general distribution to Member States.

3. The Committee's bureau, as elected at its first meeting of each year, consists of a Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen. The Chairman is elected in his/her personal capacity for the calendar year. In 1995, the bureau consisted of Mr. Nugroho Wisnumurti (Indonesia) as Chairman, with the delegations of Botswana and Italy providing the two Vice-Chairmen.

4. The Committee adopted the present report, under the no-objection procedure, on 26 January 1996. The purpose of the report is to present a factual summary of the Committee's activities since its establishment in 1994 until 31 December 1995, during which time the Committee has held four meetings.

II. SUBSEQUENT ACTION BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL

5. In operative paragraph 4 of its resolution 997 (1995) of 9 June 1995, the Security Council affirmed that the restrictions imposed by resolution 918 (1994) applied to the sale or supply of arms and matériel specified therein to persons in the States neighbouring Rwanda, if that sale or supply is for the purpose of the use of such arms or matériel within Rwanda. In operative paragraph 5 of the

same resolution, the Council called upon neighbouring States to take steps, with the aim of putting an end to factors contributing to the destabilization of Rwanda, to ensure that such arms and matériel are not transferred to Rwandan camps within their territories. In operative paragraph 6, the Council requested the Secretary-General to consult the Governments of neighbouring countries on the possibility of the deployment of United Nations military observers, and to consult, as a matter of priority, the Government of Zaire on the deployment of observers, including in the airfields located in eastern Zaire, in order to monitor the sale or supply of arms and matériel.

6. By its resolution 1005 (1995) of 17 July 1995, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decided that, notwithstanding the restrictions imposed in paragraph 13 of resolution 918 (1994), appropriate amounts of explosives intended exclusively for use in established humanitarian demining programmes may be supplied to Rwanda upon application to and authorization by the Committee.

7. On 16 August 1995, the Security Council adopted resolution 1011 (1995). In section B of that resolution, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, decided that:

(a) With immediate effect and until 1 September 1996, the restrictions imposed by paragraph 13 of resolution 918 (1994) shall not apply with regard to the sale or supply of arms and related matériel to the Government of Rwanda (para. 7);

(b) On 1 September 1996, the restrictions imposed by paragraph 13 of resolution 918 (1994) on the sale or supply of arms and related matériel to the Government of Rwanda shall terminate, unless the Council decides otherwise after its consideration of the second report of the Secretary-General referred to in paragraph 12 of resolution 1011 (1995) (para. 8);

(c) With a view to prohibiting the sale and supply of arms and related matériel to non-governmental forces for use in Rwanda, all States shall continue to prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related matériel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment and spare parts, to Rwanda, or to persons in the States neighbouring Rwanda if such sale or supply is for the purpose of the use of such arms or matériel within Rwanda, other than to the Government of Rwanda as specified in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the resolution (para. 9);

(d) No arms or related matériel sold or supplied to the Government of Rwanda may be resold to, transferred to or made available for use by any State neighbouring Rwanda or person not in the service of the Government of Rwanda, either directly or indirectly (para. 10);

(e) States shall notify the Committee established by resolution 918 (1994) of all exports from their territories of arms or related matériel to Rwanda, the Government of Rwanda shall mark and register and notify the Committee of all imports made by it of arms and related matériel and the Committee shall report regularly to the Council on notifications so received (para. 11).

The Council also requested the Secretary-General to report to it within 6 months of the date of adoption of the resolution, and again within 12 months, regarding, in particular, the export of arms and related matériel referred to in paragraph 7 of the resolution, on the basis of the reports submitted by the Committee established by resolution 918 (1994) (para. 12).

8. On 7 September 1995, the Security Council adopted resolution 1013 (1995), by which it established an International Commission of Inquiry. Operative paragraph 3 of the resolution requires the Committee established by resolution 918 (1994) to make available to the International Commission of Inquiry information relating to the sale or supply of arms and related matériel to former Rwandan government forces in the Great Lakes region in violation of Council resolutions 918 (1994), 997 (1995) and 1011 (1995).

III. SUMMARY OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMITTEE DURING THE REPORTING PERIOD

9. At its 3rd meeting, on 19 July 1995, the Committee adopted the guidelines for the conduct of its work, taking into account the provisions of resolutions 918 (1994), 997 (1995) and 1005 (1995), which were transmitted to all States and international organizations on 21 July 1995. Furthermore, by means of a press release issued on 27 July 1995, the Committee made an appeal to Governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, as well as individuals, to provide any information they may have on violations or suspected violations of the embargo imposed against Rwanda (United Nations press release SC/6074).

10. At the same meeting, the Committee also considered and approved a request received pursuant to resolution 1005 (1995) from the United States of America for the supply of a quantity of explosives and related materials for use in a bilateral humanitarian demining assistance programme (United Nations press release S/6071).

11. Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 1011 (1995), the Committee, at its 4th meeting, held on 10 October 1995, adopted the new consolidated guidelines, which incorporate the relevant provisions of section B of resolution 1011 (1995). The new consolidated guidelines were transmitted to all States and international organizations on 11 October 1995, drawing their attention in particular to operative paragraph 11 of the aforementioned resolution, which requires States to notify the Committee of all exports from their territories of arms or related matériel to Rwanda. In addition, a letter was sent on 11 October 1995 to the Government of Rwanda requesting that notifications of all imports made by it of arms and related matériel be made to the Committee in compliance with operative paragraph 11 of resolution 1011 (1995). Furthermore, by means of a press release issued on 13 October 1995, the Committee made an appeal to Governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, as well as individuals, to provide any information they may have on violations or suspected violations of the embargo imposed against Rwanda (United Nations press release SC/6113).

12. In accordance with a decision taken at its 4th meeting, a report entitled "Rearming with impunity: international support for the perpetrators of the

Rwandan genocide", received by the Committee from Rwanda, was transmitted to the Governments of China, France, South Africa and Zaire for comment. In this regard, replies received from the Governments of France and China denied the allegations of suspected violations contained in the report.

13. In response to a letter dated 12 November 1995 from the International Commission of Inquiry requesting information the Committee may have relating to the sale or supply of arms and related matériel to the former Rwandan government forces, and in accordance with operative paragraph 3 of resolution 1013 (1995), the aforementioned report, together with the replies received from the Governments of France and China, was transmitted to the International Commission of Inquiry.

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S/1996/83
6 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 1025 (1995) AND 1026 (1995)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Since my report of 23 November 1995 (S/1995/987), the Security Council has decided to establish new United Nations missions in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (resolution 1035 (1995)), and in the Republic of Croatia, the region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (resolution 1037 (1996)) and the Prevlaka peninsula area (resolution 1038 (1996)). The present report is intended to update the Council on relevant events throughout the United Nations Peace Forces (UNPF) mission area since 23 November. It is also intended to apprise the Council of the progress achieved in phasing out the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, which is known as UNCRO, and the UNPF headquarters arrangement, and to outline the structure of the new United Nations operations as from 1 February 1996. A separate report is being submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1027 (1995) on all aspects of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

II. DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING UNPF-HQ, UNCRO AND UNPROFOR

Bosnia and Herzegovina

2. The signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Annexes thereto (the Peace Agreement) (S/1995/999, annex) in Paris on 14 December 1995 led to a marked improvement in the military situation on the ground in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In many areas, the number of cease-fire violations was reduced substantially as the parties showed their readiness to comply with the terms of the Peace Agreement.

3. In keeping with Annex 1-A, article VII, of the Peace Agreement and Security Council resolution 1031 (1995), UNPROFOR began withdrawing from Bosnia and Herzegovina those parts of the Force which would not be incorporated into the multinational Implementation Force (IFOR). UNPROFOR also facilitated preparations for the arrival of IFOR. On 20 December 1995, the transfer of

authority from UNPROFOR to IFOR took place, with the IFOR commander, Admiral Leighton Smith, assuming command. At that date a number of UNPROFOR troops had already left the theatre as part of a restructuring exercise and, of the approximately 21,000 UNPROFOR and Rapid Reaction Force troops that remained, about 18,500 were designated to stay on as part of IFOR. The repatriation of the remaining 2,500 troops began in late December 1995.

Croatia

4. On 12 November 1995, the Government of Croatia and the local Serb authorities in Sector East signed the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (the Basic Agreement) (S/1995/951, annex). Subsequently, while a certain degree of tension and uncertainty remained, the level of cease-fire violations declined steadily, to almost nil. The commanders of Croatian forces in the Osijek region and the local Serb forces meet weekly, under UNCRO auspices, to discuss ways to reduce tension. In addition, there have been signs of demobilization on both sides of the zone of separation and an increase in freedom of movement for United Nations personnel.

5. In the former Sectors North, South and West, UNCRO continued, up to the expiration of its mandate on 15 January 1996, to monitor and report on the human rights situation of the remaining Serbs and of those Serbs detained as a result of Croatian military actions in May and August 1995. The situation of the Serbs who have remained in Croatia has shown some improvement as a result of measures taken by the Government of Croatia, including intensified efforts by local authorities to address the pressing humanitarian needs in the former sectors. In addition, the Government's recommendation to the Sabor to extend the time period for the Croatian Serb owners of property to return to Croatia to reclaim their property is a positive development. At the end of December 1995, charges of armed rebellion were dismissed against 450 Serb detainees; however, the International Committee of the Red Cross continues to monitor 389 people who have been detained in relation to the conflict. The lack of specificity of charges and inadequate legal representation for those Serbs who are still detained continue to be of concern. While small groups of Serbs have been readmitted to Croatia, the right to return is still being severely curtailed by the absence of constructive measures to facilitate the process of return.

6. Since my report of 23 November 1995 (S/1995/987), the withdrawal and repatriation of United Nations military personnel from Croatia has continued. The only such personnel remaining in former Sectors North, South and West are small rear parties providing security for United Nations equipment. On 1 December 1995, the command and control of UNCRO military operations in Sector East was transferred from UNCRO to UNPF headquarters.

7. Since the end of the UNCRO mandate on 15 January 1996, all United Nations civilian police officers have been withdrawn from the former sectors and are being redeployed either to Bosnia and Herzegovina or to the new operation in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium. The last civil affairs personnel were withdrawn from the former sectors on 17 January 1996. It is expected that the redeployment of all United Nations personnel and equipment will be completed by the end of February 1996, except for some military personnel who may still be required to provide logistic support to the new operation, the United Nations

Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES).

8. Following the signing of the Basic Agreement, work commenced to develop a conceptual framework and to identify activities and tasks for implementation and coordination mechanisms, as well as resource requirements. Contacts with the parties have been initiated to undertake preparatory work for the Transitional Administration, with a view to promoting understanding of the Basic Agreement and moving forward with confidence-building measures. A joint meeting on economic issues has also been held. Mr. Jacques Paul Klein, who has since been appointed Transitional Administrator, has made two visits to the region. He met with President Tudjman of Croatia and with President Milosevic of Serbia, as well as with local Serb representatives in Eastern Slavonia and Croatian Government officials at Osijek.

Prevlaka

9. Since my last report on 23 November 1995, the United Nations military observers have continued to monitor the situation in Prevlaka, which has been generally quiet and stable. In early January 1996, however, Croatian tanks and other military equipment were observed in an area to the south-east of Dubrovnik, but none of these movements by the Croatian army was in the area of the demilitarized zone. Pursuant to resolution 1038 (1996), it is my intention to maintain 28 United Nations military observers in the Prevlaka area, under the command and direction of a Chief Military Observer, who will report directly to United Nations Headquarters in New York. The mission will be known as United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP).

United Nations Peace Forces headquarters

10. UNPF headquarters (UNPF-HQ) has been providing support for my Special Representative and UNPF's constituent missions. It has also been responsible for the overall coordination, control and direction of political, military and civil affairs activities within the mission area, including the coordination of reporting on human rights. Its Division of Information has conducted information activities, including television, radio and print production, in support of the missions.

11. UNPF has maintained a liaison office in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to conduct political liaison, public information and support activities for UNPF movement through that country. The office will continue to undertake tasks relevant to the monitoring of the Prevlaka peninsula, as mandated by resolution 1038 (1996). The Belgrade liaison office has enjoyed a high level of cooperation from the federal authorities.

12. As mentioned earlier, command and control of military operations in the former Sector East, as well as the rear parties remaining in the other sectors, was transferred from UNCRO to UNPF headquarters on 1 December 1995. Except for those small rear parties, the withdrawal of UNCRO-formed military units from the former Sectors North and South and Western Slavonia was completed on 15 December 1995. On 20 December, responsibility for operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina was transferred from UNPROFOR to IFOR. UNPF headquarters was tasked

to coordinate the withdrawal from Bosnia and Herzegovina of those units which did not transfer to IFOR, with the majority to be repatriated by mid-February 1996. There have been some delays in the repatriation process attributable to the absence of decisions by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and individual countries concerning the possible transfer of troops to IFOR. The need to make careful decisions concerning financial considerations and negotiations on possible contributions to UNTAES and IFOR have been factors that have caused considerable delays in the withdrawal from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Finalization of the transfer of command to UNTAES awaits the appointment of a Force Commander and the establishment of a headquarters capable of assuming operational command of the UNTAES force. Until this occurs, command and control of UNTAES military forces will continue to be effected from Zagreb.

13. To provide policy direction for the transition of responsibilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina from UNPROFOR to IFOR, a Steering Committee on Transition of Responsibilities in the former Yugoslavia has been established. The Committee is composed of United Nations civilian and military personnel and the NATO Liaison Officer to UNPF, and it assists the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in matters pertaining to United Nations agencies and programmes that are involved in implementing the Dayton Agreement, as well as in the transition of responsibilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the United Nations to NATO.

14. A Liquidation Task Force, composed of representatives from the UNPF civilian and military staffs, was initially established on 3 November 1995 to plan, coordinate and monitor the closure of UNCRO and the restructuring of UNPROFOR. As the situation has evolved, so too has the Task Force, its focus now being the winding down of UNPF activities, the reallocation of assets to the new operations and the sale of United Nations-owned equipment to IFOR. The Task Force acts under the direction of the Assistant Secretary-General for Management and Coordination of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations.

15. The daily management of the reallocation of assets to the new operations and transfer of equipment from UNPROFOR to IFOR, as well as the repatriation of units not being transferred to IFOR, is undertaken by a Liquidation Team, also composed of both military and civilian staff. The Team will identify surplus property and make appropriate arrangements in accordance with standing United Nations rules and procedures.

III. THE NEW UNITED NATIONS MISSIONS

United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina

16. As outlined in my report of 13 December 1995 (S/1995/1031), the United Nations has two principal responsibilities under the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herzegovina. First, in addition to its ongoing humanitarian activities, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) will take the lead with respect to the return of refugees and displaced persons. Second, an International Police Task Force (IPTF) will assist the parties in carrying out their law enforcement responsibilities as stipulated in Annex 11 to the

Peace Agreement and explained in my report. By resolution 1035 (1995) of 21 December 1995 the Council authorized the establishment, for one year, of IPTF and the United Nations civilian office, placing both under the authority of the Secretary-General through a United Nations Coordinator. This operation will henceforth be referred to as the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). IPTF and the civilian office will function under the authority of the United Nations Coordinator, who will be the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission of UNMIBH, and who, in turn, will coordinate with the High Representative. Furthermore, as I have also stated in my report (S/1995/1031), there is a vital need to continue the work begun by the UNPF Mine Action Centre. Therefore, I recommend that an appropriate number of civilian personnel be deployed to form a Mine Action Centre in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as part of UNMIBH. This Mine Action Centre will work in concert with the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and IFOR and will continue until the Government can take over full responsibility for mine clearance.

17. A number of steps have been taken to establish the new United Nations mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina as quickly as possible. Mr. Antonio Pedauye was appointed Interim United Nations Coordinator for UNMIBH from 5 to 31 January and was succeeded by Mr. Iqbal Riza who was appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Coordinator of United Nations Operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 1 February. In conjunction with the end of the UNCRO mandate, most of the remaining United Nations civilian police monitors in Croatia have been redeployed. There are now about 233 monitors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, deployed under the supervision of Commissioner Peter Fitzgerald, who arrived in theatre on 29 January; further monitors are being deployed expeditiously. United Nations civilian police monitors have intensified patrols on both sides of the confrontation line in Sarajevo, and were active in negotiating the release of 19 civilians detained by Bosnian Serb authorities.

18. As additional personnel arrive in theatre, district headquarters and logistics support sites are being opened as a framework for the further deployment of monitors to individual police stations throughout the country. IPTF regions and districts, with priority being given to Sarajevo, will become operational as personnel and facilities become available. A United Nations civilian police training and support unit will be retained in Zagreb for in-theatre reception and administration of monitors for UNTAES and UNPREDEP, as well as IPTF. As at 22 January, 43 of the 51 Member States approached by the Secretariat had responded, offering a total of 1,970 monitors for employment with IPTF. I must emphasize the urgent need for the earliest possible deployment of the monitors in theatre to cope with the pressing civilian police tasks outlined in the Peace Agreement.

19. Civil affairs offices are being opened in Serb areas, and relocated as necessary in the Federation, to maintain contact with political representatives of the parties and to support IPTF at all regional headquarters and districts. These offices may participate in local and regional confidence-building, and will provide information, analysis and other support to the United Nations Coordinator and through him to the High Representative.

United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium

20. In the period leading up to the full deployment of UNTAES military forces, the civilian tasks of the Transitional Administration will be initiated as far as possible. The existing civil affairs presence in the region will be strengthened by redeployment of personnel already in theatre, to be complemented by additional staff with specialized skills, so as to take up new tasks in areas of public administration, law, elections, education, culture and economic matters. The headquarters of UNTAES will probably be located at Vukovar and there will also be a principal office at Osijek. Other offices will be in locations of administrative and political significance, such as Beli Manastir inside the region and Vinkovci outside it. In addition, the United Nations liaison offices in Zagreb and Belgrade (see para. 24 below) will be utilized to ensure close cooperation at all levels of government. The important tasks relating to the return of refugees and displaced persons will be undertaken by UNHCR in close cooperation with the Transitional Administrator. As regards elections, in accordance with paragraph 12 of the Basic Agreement, the Transitional Administrator will in due course explore with international organizations and interested States the extent to which they can provide support in overseeing the elections which are to be held no later than 30 days before the end of the transitional period.

21. Work is already in hand to advance the process of cooperation through joint meetings with local authorities. Current confidence-building activities will be intensified, in conjunction with UNHCR and other interested international partners. In particular, joint meetings at the technical level will be held on preparatory measures to open up communication links, including the Zagreb-Belgrade highway, local telephone services, railways, river ports and airfields. High priority will be given to the restoration of public services and the encouragement of local trade. The joint committees are a consultative mechanism involving both parties, and are thus the main support for the implementation by the Transitional Administrator of the civilian tasks given to him in the Basic Agreement. Member States and international organizations will be encouraged to make financial and other contributions to assist the economic recovery of the region, under the coordination of the Transitional Administrator. The UNTAES Mine Action Centre will assess the mine situation and develop appropriate proposals. In cooperation with the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, the Transitional Administrator will approach the international community for assistance in mine-clearance programmes to be implemented during the transition period.

22. The role of the police will be critical. Under the authority of the Transitional Administrator and monitored by the United Nations civilian police, local professional policemen will be selected from both sides to join the transitional police force and a training programme will be organized. This force will need to be fully trained and operational by the time demilitarization commences, so as to provide confidence and security within the region. I cannot over-emphasize the importance of Member States making available adequate numbers of high quality United Nations civilian police monitors to meet this important need.

23. The Transitional Administration will also launch a vigorous public information campaign in order to promote full understanding of its goals and priorities.

United Nations liaison offices in Zagreb and Belgrade

24. In view of the interrelated nature of the situations in the various areas of the former Yugoslavia and because of the importance of the policies of the Governments of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia regarding events within the region, I intend to retain liaison offices in Belgrade and Zagreb which will report to United Nations Headquarters in New York. The primary task of these offices will be to provide political and information support to all the United Nations missions in the former Yugoslavia. The liaison offices will maintain contacts with their respective host Governments on issues relevant to the missions; relay relevant information (including media reports) to United Nations Headquarters and to the three missions; undertake liaison tasks on behalf of the missions; provide assessments and advice to other United Nations agencies operating in the region; and provide timely and accurate public information on United Nations activities to local and international media. In addition, the Belgrade Liaison Office will include a small military cell to provide movement control functions for both road and air movements and to maintain liaison with the General Staff of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In this regard, it is assumed that the Federal Government will extend to the United Nations, its personnel, property, funds and assets, the necessary privileges and immunities deriving from Article 105, paragraph 1, of the Charter of the United Nations, the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and the customary principles and practices applicable to United Nations peace-keeping or similar operations. Negotiations have commenced with the Government of Croatia to extend the existing Status of Forces Agreement to include UNTAES and the proposed liaison office in Zagreb.

IV. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS

25. A detailed review of the question of establishing independent administrative support structures for both UNTAES and UNMIBH has shown that in order to support the functioning of the substantive components of the missions it is imperative to retain for the time being the centralized administrative support structure currently established in UNPF. Independent administrations in the two missions will be set up later without hampering substantive work.

26. It is intended that, with the phasing out of the UNPF-HQ arrangement on 31 January 1996, the administrative support structure of the mission will enter into a transition phase, to be implemented by a Transition Office for United Nations Operations in the Former Yugoslavia, which will be located in Zagreb; its task will be to provide all aspects of administrative support for UNTAES and UNMIBH, as well as for the Prevlaka mission (UNMOP), the Zagreb and Belgrade liaison offices and, whenever necessary, UNPREDEP. Parallel to these responsibilities, the Transition Office will assist in building up independent administrative support structures for the new missions and perform administrative liquidation tasks for UNCRO, UNPROFOR and UNPF.

27. It is planned to retain the present structure, staffing level and material resources of the UNPF Division of Administration upon its transfer to the Transition Office for a period of up to five months (until the end of June 1996), taking into account the deployment schedule of UNTAES and UNMIBH. A part of this structure includes a military liquidation team which expects to complete its tasks by the end of March 1996. As separate administrative support infrastructures are established in the new missions, personnel and assets held by the Transition Office will be transferred to them as quickly as circumstances on the ground will allow, including the availability of adequate office space and facilities to enable them to undertake independent administrative operations by the end of the transitional period. Thereafter, the functions of the Transition Office will be amalgamated with those of the UNPF Liquidation Team and a minimal staff will finalize the administrative liquidation of the former United Nations missions in the area.

28. For reasons of cost-effectiveness, it is envisaged that some elements of administrative support for UNMIBH, UNMOP and UNTAES, such as the communications master network control centre, transport spare parts warehousing and, possibly, civilian air support, will continue to be centralized, and will be attached to one of the new missions in the area for administrative and budgetary purposes.

V. OBSERVATIONS

29. For almost four years, United Nations peace-keeping missions in the countries of the former Yugoslavia have worked tirelessly in dangerous and adverse conditions, often without sufficient resources and under complex and demanding mandates. Lightly armed peace-keepers and unarmed civilians were sent into areas of active warfare, where their courageous efforts helped to save untold human lives and to alleviate the suffering of the civilian population. At the same time, it became obvious that a peace-keeping mission cannot achieve its objectives without the unfailing support and commitment of the international community in terms of financial and human resources required for the implementation of its mandate, as well as the full cooperation of the parties to the conflict.

30. However, with the new momentum created by the Dayton Peace Agreement and the Basic Agreement on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, it is gratifying that United Nations expertise and experience have been recognized and that the new missions have been given appropriate tasks as part of a collective international endeavour to bring peace where only war has raged. None the less, adequate and appropriate resources for these United Nations missions remain of crucial importance. I am particularly concerned that the major international effort in Bosnia and Herzegovina should not obscure and deflect the need for substantial resources to be committed to UNTAES in Croatia. Failure in Croatia would not only have disastrous consequences for the local population but could also seriously undermine, and even lead to the failure of, international operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, sowing the seeds for renewal of military contention following the withdrawal of IFOR. The Council's decision to authorize an initial troop strength of 5,000 for UNTAES makes it clear that the mission can succeed only if it receives the constant cooperation of the parties. In this context, mutual recognition between the Republic of Croatia

and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) could be the most important factor in ensuring the peaceful transition of the region and the ability of all refugees and displaced persons to return voluntarily to their homes.

31. In Croatia, the primary responsibility for protecting the human rights of all its people, including minorities, lies with the Government. With the termination of the UNCRO mission, it is now up to other organizations and regional institutions to continue to meet the international community's concerns about respect for the human rights of minorities. Observance of human rights is the fundamental building block of democracy, stability and international acceptability for all States. It is my intention to continue to report on the human rights situation throughout the States of the former Yugoslavia, relying on the continuing work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Special Rapporteur in accordance with their respective mandates.

32. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the prospect of a major Serb exodus from parts of Sarajevo in advance of the return to government control under the Peace Agreement is a matter of great concern. I would hope that the combined international presence and effort, together with the full support and credible guarantees and actions by the Government, would create sufficient confidence for those Serbs to remain and for those who have already left to return. In this context, the practice of destruction of property and possessions prior to departure is both short-sighted and inadvisable, in that it minimizes the possibility of return and reduces the chances of compensation for property voluntarily abandoned and destroyed.

33. I am also concerned at the continuing difficulties on the ground in establishing the Federation as a viable and harmonious entity. While there appears to be full commitment at the intergovernmental level to making the Federation work, it will require constant nurturing, encouragement and support at the local level if it is to function as one of the two pillars of the Peace Agreement. An experienced United Nations presence throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, working in close cooperation with IFOR and the High Representative, will make a substantial contribution to the common cause.

34. In making the necessary arrangements for the new United Nations missions established pursuant to Security Council resolutions 1035 (1995), 1037 (1996) and 1038 (1996), it is my intention to maintain a sufficient, but lean and cost-effective, staffing structure appropriate to the mandates of the new missions. I propose to terminate the post of Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Former Yugoslavia and phase out his office by the end of February, the residual political support and liaison functions in Croatia being entrusted to the new Zagreb Liaison Office. In this context, I pay tribute to the work of Mr. Kofi Annan, my Special Representative for the Former Yugoslavia, in planning and establishing the new structures, in coordinating the transfer of responsibilities to IFOR, and in working with the large number of individuals and organizations that are bringing peace to the States of the former Yugoslavia. I also wish to place on record my warm appreciation to all the men and women who have served the cause of the United Nations so well in those countries.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/84
6 February 1996
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 2 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF RWANDA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey to you the reactions of the Government of Rwanda to the interim report of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate reports of the sale or supply of arms to former Rwandan government forces in violation of the embargo proclaimed under Security Council resolution 1013 (1995) (S/1996/67, annex).

Having taken cognizance of the contents of that report, the Government of Rwanda sympathizes with the Commission regarding the difficulties and obstacles its members encountered in performing their task.

On the other hand, the Government of Rwanda is dismayed by the reaction of the Secretary-General, in his letter addressed to you on 29 January 1996, regarding the information and observations contained in the Commission's report. The Secretary-General intends to request the Commission to submit its final report by the end of February 1996, unless it makes progress in the coming weeks in resolving the difficulties it is encountering. And yet the Secretary-General is well aware that the Commission is not in a position to resolve these difficulties, and consequently he is facing the Commission with yet another obstacle in addition to those it has already encountered.

One of the objectives of the Commission was, and I quote, "To recommend measures to end the illegal flow of arms in the subregion in violation of the Council resolutions".

A further reason justifying the Commission's need for support and its existence is the explosive situation in the region of the Great Lakes countries, which has been exacerbated by the uncontrolled circulation of arms and by the criminal infiltrations within the western frontiers of Rwanda and Burundi.

The Government of Rwanda is convinced that the interruption of the Commission's work will be tantamount to encouraging violation of the embargo proclaimed under resolution 1013 (1995) and constitutes an encouragement to the criminals, and the country harbouring them, to continue the active infiltration across the frontiers of Rwanda and Burundi by destabilizing elements, part of

which took part in the acts of genocide in Rwanda. For this reason, contrary to the recommendations of the Secretary-General, the Government of Rwanda requests the Security Council to strengthen the authority of the Commission and give it the means necessary in order for it to be able to discharge its mandate in the context of the efforts to ensure peace and security in the region.

It is in this context that these acts, which are continuing to disturb peace and security in the region, have on many occasions been denounced by the Government of Rwanda through its Permanent Representative to the United Nations, notably in the letters of 16 March 1995 and 5 July 1995 addressed to the President of the Security Council.

In its report, the Commission clearly identified indicators which confirm the possibilities that Rwandan elements located in the Goma region are being armed. The indicators identified are the following:

- Confirmation by four organizations enjoying international credibility, such as African Rights, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the BBC, that former Rwandan government forces are being armed;

- The Rwandan Government has provided clear evidence that former forces of the Rwandan Army are being armed on Iwawa island, which was visited by the Commission, and has also been the target of infiltrations which are recognized in all the Secretary-General's reports on Rwanda;

- The visit to Iwawa island and the interview with members of the former Rwandan armed forces who had been taken prisoner;

- The confusion that prevailed at Goma airport between June and August 1994 at the time when refugees were arriving and Operation Turquoise was being conducted;

- The information gathered in Goma from a variety of sources that gave rise to suspicion that clandestine activities were being carried out, such as:

  - The mysterious night flights to an airport in Goma which is not equipped to receive flights after dark;

  - The exclusion by the authorities of access to the airport at those times;

  - The unloading of cargo from the aircraft in secret;

  - The exclusion from certain areas by the former Rwandan government forces;

- "Information made available [to the Commission] from published sources was extremely detailed and circumstantial";

- The involvement of Air Zaire and senior government figures;

- The Commission recognizes that it had before it "detailed and voluminous information suggesting that arms deliveries had been made to Goma airport in Zaire for the use of the former Rwandan government forces".

Despite all of this evidence, the Commission did not reach satisfactory conclusions for the following reasons:

- "The Commission has neither the legal powers ... of a police force or an established investigative agency". Clearly, a weak commission cannot investigate a situation falling under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;

- The long delay between the establishment of the Commission of Inquiry and the time when the events to be investigated took place;

- More serious, one member of the Security Council who contributed to the drafting of resolution 1013 (1995) was designated to represent his country in the Commission. He is thus both judge and party;

- Still more serious, the Government which requested the establishment of the Commission and accepted its mandate was the first to place obstacles in the way of the Commission in discharging the mandate assigned to it by the Security Council.

In the light of all the foregoing circumstances, and of the importance of the inquiries and the recommendation of measures to end the illegal flow of arms in the Great Lakes region, as well as to put an end to the violation of the Security Council resolutions, the Government of Rwanda recommends that:

- The Commission should continue its activities in accordance with its mandate;

- A resolution should be adopted to strengthen the capacity and resources of the Commission in order for it to be able to discharge its mandate;

- Appropriate measures should be taken against the countries that refuse to cooperate with the Commission;

- The plan to station foreign forces in the countries that are not contributing to peace and security in the region should be completely abandoned.

The Government of Rwanda is aware of the important role of the Commission and of its impact on stability and peace in the Great Lakes region. For that reason it requests the Secretary-General, and in particular the Security Council, to exercise their authority in order to ensure that the Commission operates effectively with a view to preventing further acts of genocide. For its part, the Government of Rwanda will spare no effort to render the Commission all necessary support, in transparency and with no impediment.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Manzi BAKURAMUTSA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Rwanda
to the United Nations

UNITED
NATIONS

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General Assembly
Security Council

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GENERAL

A/50/872
S/1996/85
6 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 28
THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 31 January 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I wish to draw your attention to the enormous efforts that Italy has made in support of past and present operations carried out by the international community to restore peace and stability in the former Yugoslavia. My country has thus far deployed thousands of men and has paid a heavy tribute in blood (10 dead and 7 wounded).

This commitment, as the annexes show, has resulted in an extraordinary financial burden, amounting to more than $500 million (12 months of the Implementation Force (IFOR) operation included). This sum is drawn exclusively from the national budget, since no reimbursement is expected from the United Nations.

Italy's contribution demonstrates the significant and often silent role that it has played and continues to play in favour of the United Nations, particularly in the former Yugoslavia.

The reason I am writing is not only to provide this information but also by way of example and incentive to other States. I would be very grateful if the present letter and its annexes would be circulated as a document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 28, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) F. Paolo FULCI
Ambassador and
Permanent Representative

96-02728 (E) 070296 090296

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ANNEX I

Italy's engagement in the former Yugoslavia
until the Dayton agreements

1. Maritime surveillance

Italy has taken part since 16 July 1992 in the Western European Union (WEU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) surveillance operations at sea (respectively "Operation Sharp Vigilance" and "Operation Maritime Monitors") for the enforcement of Security Council resolutions 713 (1991) and 757 (1992), and since 16 July 1993 in the NATO/WEU joint operation "Sharp Guard" for the enforcement of the embargo and naval blockade of the Montenegro harbours, in accordance with Security Council resolutions 787 (1992) and 820 (1993). Three Italian ships have been deployed continuously.

Statistical data on embargo activities carried out to date are as follows:

Units questioned	61 011
Units inspected	6 019
Units rerouted	1 426

The total cost of the operation thus far amounts to approximately $130 million.

2. Waterways surveillance

The WEU monitoring operation "Enforcement Danube" has been in place since 18 June 1993 to enforce the United Nations embargo on the Danube river. The Italian participation consists of 64 men and 2 motor patrol boats.

The Italian customs police inspected 2,070 convoys, carrying out 3,238 missions.

3. Air surveillance

(a) Participation in operation "Sharp Guard"

Italy provided additional support for this operation until 16 October 1995, making available eight Tornado aircraft, two maritime patrol aircraft and one HH3F helicopter for rescue, to protect the Task Group operating along the coast of Montenegro.

The cost of the operation has been approximately $88 million.

(b) Operation "Deny Flight"

Italy has made available 14 airports: Aviano, Rivolto, Istrana, Vicenza, Villafranca, Ghedi, Malpensa, Cervia, Pisa, Gioia del Colle, Brindisi, Sigonella, Palermo and Trapani.

Moreover, Italy granted the use of three training areas: Maniago, Cellina Maduna and Punta della Contessa.

Since August 1995, in the framework of possible air strikes and close air support operations in assistance to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and the Rapid Reaction Forces, Italy made available to NATO 14 fighter bombers, 4 transport aircraft and 1 replenishment aircraft.

The cost of the operation has been about $60 million.

4. European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM)

Italian commitments began in July 1992 with the following contribution: 32 officers, 21 non-commissioned officers and 4 motor vehicles.

In the past Italy has deployed up to 80 men, 50 vehicles and 4 helicopters.

The cost of the operation has thus far amounted to $18 million.

5. Unified Police Force in Mostar (UPFM)

A unified police force, comprising Croats, Muslims and a component of WEU police, has been operating at Mostar since 23 July 1994. Italy participates in the force with 20 Carabinieri (3 officers, 14 non-commissioned officers, 1 corporal and 2 privates).

The estimated cost of the operation (from 9 March 1995 to 22 July 1996) is $2.7 million.

6. Humanitarian aids

Italy has made available land, maritime and air carriers in order to assist the people of the former Yugoslavia.

The Italian armed forces provided airlifts from Ancona and Pisa to Sarajevo and Belgrade.

The cost of the operation has thus far amounted to approximately $11 million.

ANNEX II

Italian contribution to the Implementation Force

1. Forces assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

(a) Land forces

1 mechanized brigade:

- Mechanized regiment
- Artillery battalion
- Special forces unit
- Armoured company
- Support unit
- Logistic unit

(b) Naval forces

4 frigates

4 minesweepers and 1 command ship

2 landing ships

2 coastal transport ships

1 oceangoing tug

(c) Air forces

14 tactical aircraft (8 Tornado and 6 AMX)

5 transport aircraft (1 C130 and 4 G222)

2 maritime patrol aircraft

1 replenishment aircraft

(d) Theatre reserve

600 marines and 2 landing ships

2. Logistics support

In addition to the forces made available to IFOR, the following national bases have been made available to the Allied Forces:

(a) Twenty-one military and civilian airports for the deployment of a maximum of 250 aircraft (Aviano, Istrana, Ghedi, Piacenza, Cervia, Grosseto, Gioia del Colle, Amendola, Grazzanise, Sigonella, Treviso, Vicenza, Verona-Villafranca, Rimini, Pisa, Napoli, Brindisi, Trapani, Cagliari, Genova and Ronchi dei Legionari);

(b) Nine ports or naval bases (Trieste, Venezia, Monfalcone, Ancona, Bari, Brindisi, Taranto, Messina and Augusta);

(c) A multinational logistic base, located in north-east Italy, made of 14 army barracks, capable of supporting external forces up to 3,000 men and 1,000 vehicles;

(d) A forward logistic site (comprising Ancona harbour and Falconara airport), which provides logistic support to the naval forces in the Adriatic sea;

(e) San Vito dei Normanni base as a transit area capable of supporting 1,200 men.

A breakdown of Italian military personnel involved in the operation is as follows:

Land components on the ground	2 500
Maritime components	2 500
Theatre reserve force	600
Air components	650
Logistic support	4 700
Total (approximate)	11 000

3. Additional commitments:

(a) Thousands of police, customs officers and communication operators are deployed for the security and control of allied forces and air/naval bases. The Italian air defence system and air traffic control are also heavily involved.

(b) The existing United Nations bases in Italy (Brindisi and Pisa) are of fundamental importance for any United Nations activity in the former Yugoslavia.

4. The overall financial burden of the Italian contribution to the operations in the area amounts to about $220 million for 12 months.

UNITED NATIONS **S**

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1996/86
8 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolution 696 (1991) of 30 May 1991 and all subsequent relevant resolutions,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 31 January 1996 (S/1996/75),

Reaffirming its commitment to preserve the unity and territorial integrity of Angola,

Reiterating the importance it attaches to the full implementation by the Government of Angola and União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) of the "Acordos de Paz" (S/22609, annex), the Lusaka Protocol (S/1994/1441, annex) and relevant Security Council resolutions,

Deeply concerned at delays in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol and the lack of steady progress towards lasting peace,

Concerned also at the deteriorating humanitarian situation in many parts of Angola and, in particular, at the lack of security guarantees and freedom of movement for the personnel of humanitarian organizations,

Emphasizing the importance of reconstruction and rehabilitation of the Angolan national economy and its vital contribution to durable peace,

Recalling its resolution 976 (1995) of 8 February 1995 which stated, inter alia, the expectation that UNAVEM III would complete its mission by February 1997,

Noting that one-half of the duration of UNAVEM III's mission, as envisaged in resolution 976 (1995), has already elapsed, while implementation of the Lusaka Protocol is seriously behind schedule,

Noting also the agreement between the Government of Angola and UNITA of 21 December 1995, and welcoming the efforts of the Secretary-General, his

Special Representative and the three observer States to the Angolan peace process to facilitate the establishment of a revised timetable for implementing the tasks in the agreement between the two parties at Bailundo of 9 January 1996,

Welcoming the efforts by Member States, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the international community as a whole to promote peace and security in Angola,

1. Welcomes the report of the Secretary-General dated 31 January 1996;

2. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAVEM III until 8 May 1996;

3. Expresses deep concern at the numerous delays in the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, reminds the Government of Angola and UNITA of their obligations to consolidate the peace process and, in this regard, urges them to maintain an effective cease-fire, conclude their military talks on integration of the armed forces, undertake active engagement in the demining process, and commence the integration of UNITA personnel into administrative and governmental institutions in furtherance of the objective of national reconciliation;

4. Welcomes the positive steps taken by the Government of Angola in implementing its commitments, in particular the cessation of offensive operations, the withdrawal of its troops from offensive positions in the vicinity of UNITA quartering areas, the release of all prisoners registered by the International Committee of the Red Cross, the beginning of the quartering of the rapid reaction police, and the termination of contracts of expatriate personnel as agreed;

5. Expresses the expectation that the Government of Angola will continue its progress with the goal of fully implementing its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol, including quartering of the rapid reaction police, deployment to barracks of the Angolan Armed Forces, the repatriation of expatriate personnel as agreed, and the drawing up of a programme for disarming the civilian population;

6. Expresses deep concern at the slow pace of quartering and disarming UNITA troops, notes the public commitment by UNITA to quarter its troops in an expeditious and comprehensive fashion and reiterates its conviction that the quartering of UNITA forces, as the first step in its transformation to a legitimate political party, is a crucial component of the peace process;

7. Urges UNITA to proceed immediately with the orderly, large-scale and verifiable movement of its troops to the quartering areas at Vila Nova, Lunduimbali, Negage and Quibaxe, without further interruption, in strict adherence to the new timetable agreed by the parties on 9 January 1996, and in full cooperation with UNAVEM III;

8. Calls upon UNITA, following completion of this initial quartering, to proceed immediately with the orderly movement of all of its troops to the other quartering areas and to conclude all quartering within the time of this mandate renewal;

9. Also calls upon UNITA to extend full cooperation to UNAVEM III and the Joint Commission at all levels, including the exchange of military information as required by the Lusaka Protocol;

10. Further calls upon UNITA to release all remaining prisoners;

11. Calls upon the two parties, in particular UNITA, to ensure the freedom of movement of people and goods throughout the country;

12. Also calls upon the two parties, in particular UNITA, to cooperate fully with humanitarian organizations by granting them all the necessary security guarantees and freedom of movement to facilitate their work;

13. Reminds the Government of Angola and UNITA of their obligation to cease the dissemination of hostile propaganda;

14. Notes the importance attached to the dissemination of impartial information by UNAVEM radio and calls upon the Government of Angola to provide all the facilities necessary for the independent functioning of that radio;

15. Encourages both the President of Angola and the Chairman of UNITA to meet, as soon as possible and thereafter on a regular basis, to promote mutual confidence and achieve the full, fair and speedy implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, including its provisions on national reconciliation and other outstanding issues;

16. Commends the Joint Commission for the positive role it continues to play in support of the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol;

17. Commends also the efforts of the Secretary-General, his Special Representative and the personnel of UNAVEM III to facilitate the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol;

18. Urges the international community to continue to provide the assistance necessary to facilitate the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the Angolan national economy, provided that the two parties meet their obligations under the Lusaka Protocol;

19. Reaffirms the obligation of all States to implement fully the provisions of paragraph 19 of resolution 864 (1993);

20. Urges all States, in particular those neighbouring Angola, to facilitate the process of national reconciliation in Angola and to take steps in their territory to facilitate full implementation of the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol;

21. Requests the Secretary-General to report by 7 March 1996, 4 April 1996 and 1 May 1996 on the progress made by the Government of Angola and UNITA in taking concrete steps towards meeting the goals and timetable agreed between them, and to keep the Council fully informed on developments in the situation on the ground, so that the Council may respond accordingly;

22. Expresses its readiness, in light of recommendations by the Secretary-General and developments in Angola, to consider any further measures;

23. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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GENERAL

S/1996/87
6 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached communication, dated 6 February 1996, which I have received from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

I would appreciate your bringing it to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

96-02800 (E) 060296 070296

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Annex

Letter dated 6 February 1996 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

I am writing with respect to paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 1022 (1995).

In my letter to you of 23 January, and my subsequent letter of the same date to the President of the Security Council, I indicated that the parties to the Peace Agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina had withdrawn their forces from the agreed cease-fire line zone of separation, as required at "D+30" by article IV, paragraph 2 (a), of annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement.

I am now able to inform you of the assessment by the Implementation Force (IFOR) Commander that Bosnian Serb forces have also withdrawn from those areas to be transferred to the other entity, as required at "D+45" by article IV, paragraph 3 (a), thus establishing the basis for a new zone of separation along the inter-entity boundary line, which the Peace Agreement provides will come into existence at "D+90".

(Signed) Javier SOLANA

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General Assembly
Security Council

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S/1996/88
7 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Fiftieth session
Agenda item 55
QUESTION OF CYPRUS

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-first year

Letter dated 5 February 1996 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 2 January 1996 addressed to you by His Excellency Mr. Osman Ertuğ, Representative of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex would be circulated as a document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 55, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hüseyin E. ÇELEM
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

96-02905 (E) 080296 090296

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ANNEX

Letter dated 2 January 1996 from Mr. Osman Ertuğ
to the Secretary-General

It has recently come to my attention that the founder of the "Byzantine Academy" in southern Cyprus has sent a letter to Your Excellency in connection with the religious heritage in northern Cyprus. Since the said letter, as reported in the Greek Cypriot press, contains a barrage of unfounded allegations against the Turkish Cypriot side and Turkey, I have the honour to send this communication to Your Excellency in order to put on record the facts pertaining to this matter.

At the outset, I wish to refer to my previous letter dated 28 November 1995 addressed to you on this subject which was circulated as document A/50/800-S/1995/1007. At the risk of repetition, I would like to reiterate some of the salient points in that communication, before elaborating on some of the other aspects of the Greek Cypriot letter.

Allegations on "systematic destruction" of cultural property in the north are not new and have been conclusively refuted not only by the Turkish Cypriot side, but also by independent sources, including a prominent United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) expert and the relevant committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

It should be recalled that, in a letter he wrote to the London Times, the respected UNESCO expert, Mr. Jacques Dallibard, who had visited Cyprus twice in 1975, observed that "there was no systematic and organized looting of the cultural heritage of Cyprus. And on the whole, considering that a war took place, the losses are small".

On the other hand, Mr. Ymenus van der Werff, General Rapporteur of the Subcommittee on the Architectural and Artistic Heritage of the Committee on Culture and Education of the Council of Europe, who had come to the island with a delegation of experts to study the situation regarding cultural property in both parts of the island, reported the following on this subject in paragraph 5.3 of his report, which was published as a document of the Council of Europe on 2 July 1989 under the symbol AS/CULT/AA(41)1: "We saw no churches destroyed though St. George in Limnia (in the north) was listed as such."

Contrary to what is claimed, it is the Greek Cypriot side that has always tried, and continues to try, to eradicate all traces of the Turkish-Muslim heritage of Cyprus, particularly during the years between 1963-1974, when they attempted to "cleanse" the island of its ethnic Turkish population through massacre, expulsion and various methods of intimidation. During that tragic period, mosques, shrines and other places of Muslim worship in 103 villages across the island had been destroyed, including the historic Grand Mosque in the southern town of Paphos. The following quotation on this subject taken from the aforementioned Council of Europe report is sad, yet revealing:

"5.3 We noted with regret the complete destruction of the main mosque in Paphos. The whole area has since been flattened to give way for a widened road junction and a car park. There is no memorial to the existence of the mosque. Below the road a Turkish bath complex remains hidden in rubble and vegetation awaiting restoration. The Turkish Cypriot cemetery by the nearby St. Sophia Mouttalos mosque is dilapidated."

Today, the Greek Cypriot side continues to show utter contempt for what is left of the Turkish-Islamic heritage in southern Cyprus. For instance, the historic Bayraktar Mosque on the ancient walls of Nicosia, which is located in the Greek sector of the city, and which had been repeatedly attacked and bombed before 1974 has again been the target of several bombing and arson attacks. The reason is that the mosque stands as a symbol of the centuries-old Turkish-Islamic heritage of the island, and a powerful reminder that Cyprus is not a Greek island.

Regarding the allegations of desecration made in the said letter over the conversion of a number of churches into mosques or museums, it should be emphasized that conservation of historic buildings through use is not only permissible but also recommended under relevant international instruments. For instance, the Amsterdam Declaration, which was issued by the Congress on the European Architectural Heritage in October 1975, states the following:

"It has been shown that historic buildings can be given new functions related to the needs of contemporary life. [p. 7, para. 3]

"... Local authorities should ... afford functions to buildings which, whilst respecting their character, correspond to the needs of contemporary life and thus ensure their survival. [p. 9, paras. 3 and 5]

"A policy of conservation also means the integration of the architectural heritage into social life." [p. 10, para. 5]

The same objectives are expressed in the Charter of Venice, which was drawn up in May 1964 by the International Congress of Architects and Technicians on Historical Monuments. According to article 5 of this Charter, "the conservation of historical buildings can be achieved through use for any useful communal purpose. This is a desirable way of use, however the original plan and ornaments of the buildings should be respected and should not be altered".

In line with the above, the aforementioned Council of Europe report states the following in paragraph 5.3:

"In several cases the churches are used; whether as mosques or for other purposes ..."

"Although the point is controversial, we find it difficult to criticize such reuse. As the Turkish Cypriots point out, it has been general Council of Europe policy for some time to urge reuse of redundant religious buildings ..."

Noteworthy among the churches and religious buildings currently being used as icon museums in northern Cyprus are the Church of Archangel Michael in Girne, the Monastery of St. Barnabas in Gazimağusa, the Church of St. Mamas in Güzelyurt, the Church of the Virgin Mary in Karaman and the Church of Bellapais in Beylerbeyi.

It will be seen from the foregoing that the Greek Cypriot side's complaints in this regard have no basis and are utterly unjustified. Since it is the Greek Cypriot side which has systematically attacked, destroyed or treated with utter disrespect cultural and religious monuments, places of worship and other elements of culture belonging to the Turkish-Muslim heritage of the island, the Greek Cypriot charges on this issue appear as an attempt to shift the blame for the other side's own misdeeds on the Turkish Cypriot side.

I am confident that, in view of the above, Your Excellency will duly dismiss the allegations of the "Byzantine Academy", whose aim is clearly to exploit cultural matters for political propaganda purposes, and remind this organization that this attitude is not conducive to rapprochement between the two communities in Cyprus.

I would be grateful if the present letter is circulated as a document of the fiftieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 55, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Osman ERTUĞ
Representative
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

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S/1996/89
7 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ITALY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On behalf of the European Union I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a statement by the Presidency of the European Union on the recent bombing in Colombo.

I should be grateful if you could have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) F. Paolo FULCI
Ambassador

96-02911 (E) 070296 080296

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Annex

[Original: English and French]

Statement on the recent bombing in Colombo, issued on 6 February 1996 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union

The European Union:

- Strongly condemns the recent bombing in Colombo which killed dozens of people and left dozens more injured, for there is no justification for targeting areas that are so heavily populated by civilians;

- Expresses its sympathy to the Government of Sri Lanka and to the families of the victims;

- Continues to support a negotiated peaceful political settlement of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka;

- Believes that the wide-ranging proposals of the Government of Sri Lanka for constitutional reform, which will be presented to the Parliamentary Select Committee on constitutional reforms in the middle of this month, constitute a sound basis for a peaceful solution to this tragic conflict.

UNITED
NATIONS

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7 February 1996

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ITALY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On behalf of the European Union I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a statement by the Presidency of the European Union on the coup d'état in Niger.

I should be grateful if you could have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) F. Paolo FULCI
Ambassador

96-02917 (E) 070296 080296

/...

Annex

[Original: English and French]

Statement on the coup d'état in Niger, issued on 29 January 1996 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union

The European Union condemns the coup d'état that took place in Niger on 27 January 1996, interrupting abruptly the process of democratization launched in 1993 with legislative and presidential elections. The European Union deplores the decision of the military to take over power, to overthrow democratically elected authorities and to suspend the constitution and political parties.

The perpetrators of the coup d'état will be held responsible for the safety of the legitimate authorities who are currently being detained. The European Union demands their liberation and the restoration of constitutional law.

In conformity with article 366-bis of the Convention of Lomé, the European Union has decided to suspend its development cooperation with Niger for a period of six months, except for humanitarian assistance and aid directly benefiting the poorest sections of the population.

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ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 6 FEBRUARY 1996 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ITALY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On behalf of the European Union I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a statement by the Presidency of the European Union on the coup d'état in Sierra Leone.

I should be grateful if you could have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) F. Paolo FULCI
Ambassador

96-02923 (E) 070296 080296

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Annex

[Original: English and French]

Statement on the coup d'état in Sierra Leone, issued on 24 January 1996 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union

The European Union was concerned to hear that a coup d'état had taken place in Sierra Leone on 16 January 1996. This runs counter to the expectations of the international community, even more since the country is plagued, among others things, by a deteriorating humanitarian situation to the detriment of the civilian population.

The European Union also took note of the public commitment made by General Bio, Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), to continue with the democratic transition process.

The European Union hopes that recent events will in no way compromise the holding of free and democratic elections, which are scheduled to take place on 26 February 1996. The European Union is convinced that a democratic system in which all political factions participate and a fully accountable civilian government which respects human rights, remain the best guarantee of stability and prosperity for the people of Sierra Leone. This, in turn, is an important element in the stability of the entire region of West Africa.

The European Union will continue to monitor the situation and expects that all necessary measures will be taken to enable the democratization process to go ahead according to the stated intention.

The continued support of the European Union for this process will be assessed in the light of progress made in this regard. The central and eastern European countries associated with the European Union and the associated countries Cyprus and Malta align themselves with this statement.